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This paper surveys the history of the oil industry with a particular focus on the events associated with
significant changes in the price of oil.  Although oil was used much differently and was substantially
less important economically in the nineteenth century than it is today, there are interesting parallels
between events in that era and more recent developments.  Key post-World-War-II oil shocks reviewed
include the Suez Crisis of 1956-57, the OPEC oil embargo of 1973-1974, the Iranian revolution of
1978-1979, the Iran-Iraq War initiated in 1980, the first Persian Gulf War in 1990-91, and the oil price
spike of 2007-2008.  Other more minor disturbances are also discussed, as are the economic downturns
that followed each of the major postwar oil shocks.
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1. 1859-1899: Let there be light. 
  Illuminants, lubricants, and solvents in the 1850s were obtained from a variety of 
sources, such as oil from lard or whale, alcohol from agricultural products, and turpentine 
from wood.  Several commercial enterprises produced petroleum or gas from treatment of 
coal, asphalt, coal-tars, and even shale.  But a new era began when Edwin Drake 
successfully produced commercially usable quantities of crude oil from a 69-foot well in 
Pennsylvania in 1859. 
  From the beginning, this was recognized as an extremely valuable commodity, as 
Derrick’s Hand-Book of Petroleum (1898, p. 706) described: 
Petroleum was in fair demand at the time of Colonel Drake and his associates.... 
for practical experiments had proved that it made a better illuminant than could be 
manufactured from cannel coal by the Gessner and Downer processes.  All that 
could be obtained from the surface springs along Oil creek and the salt wells of 
the Allegheny valley found a ready market at prices ranging from 75 cents to 
$1.50 and even $2.00 per gallon. 
 
With about 40 gallons in a barrel, the upper range quoted corresponds to $80 per barrel of 
crude oil, or $1,900/barrel in 2009 dollars.  Given the expensive process of making oil 
from coal and the small volumes in which an individual household consumed the product, 
obtaining oil by drilling into the earth appeared to be a bargain: 
Drake’s discovery broke the market.  The fact that the precious oil could be 
obtained in apparently inexhaustible quantities by drilling wells in the rocky crust 
of the earth, was a great surprise.  The first product of the Drake well was sold at 
50 cents a gallon, and the price for oil is generally given at $20.00 a barrel from 
August, 1859 down to the close of the year. 
 
As production from Pennsylvania wells increased, the price quickly fell, averaging 
$9.60/barrel during 1860, which would correspond to $228/barrel in 2009 dollars.   
  Not surprisingly, such prices stimulated a fury of drilling efforts throughout the 
region.  Production quadrupled from a half million barrels in 1860 to over 2 million in 3 
1861, and the price quickly dropped to $2/barrel by the end of 1860 and 10 cents a barrel 
by the end of 1861.  Many new would-be oil barons abandoned the industry just as 
quickly as they had entered. 
  1862-1864: The first oil shock. The onset of the U.S. Civil War brought about a 
surge in prices and commodity demands generally.  The effects on the oil market were 
amplified by the cut-off of supplies of turpentine from the South and more importantly by 
the introduction of a tax on alcohol, which rose from 20¢/gallon in 1862 to $2/gallon by 
1865 (Ripy, 1999) in contrast to the 10¢/gallon tax on petroleum-derived illuminants.  
Assuming a yield of about 20 gallons of illuminant per barrel of crude, each 10¢/gallon 
tax differential on illuminant amounted to a $2/barrel competitive advantage for oil.  As a 
result, the tax essentially eliminated alcohol as a competitor to petroleum as a source for 
illuminants.  Moreover, the price collapse of 1861 had led to the closure of many of the 
initial drilling operations, while water flooding and other problems forced out many 
others.   The result was that oil production began to decline after 1862, even as new 
pressures on demand grew (see Figure 1). 
  Figure 2 plots the inflation-adjusted price of oil from 1860 to 2009.
1  The price is 
plotted on a logarithmic scale, so that a vertical move of 10 units corresponds 
approximately to a 10% price change.
2  As a result of these big increases in demand and 
drops in supply, the increase in the relative price of oil during the U.S. Civil War was as 
                                                 
1 The number plotted is the series for oil prices in 2009 dollars from British Petroleum, Statistical Review of 
World Energy 2010, which are also the numbers used by Dvir and Rogoff (2010).  The source for the BP 
nominal price series appears to be the same as Jenkins (1985, Table 18), which were then evidently deflated 
using the consumer price index (BLS) for all items from Historical Statistics of the United States, Table 
E135-166.  Since Jenkins original series goes back to 1860, that value ($9.59/barrel, almost identical to that 
reported in Derrick’s Hand-Book, p. 711) is also included in the figure provided here.  As noted in the text, 
the early Pennsylvanian market started even higher than this and was somewhat chaotic.  
2 If  [] 100 ln( ) ln( ) 10, ts PP ×−= then 
0.1 /1 . 1 0 5 , ts PP e ==  meaning that  t P  is 10.5% higher than  . s P  4 
big as the rise during the 1970s. 
  1865-1899: Evolution of the industry. After the war, demand for all commodities 
fell significantly.  At the same time, drilling in promising new areas of Pennsylvania had 
resulted in a renewed growth in production.  The result was a second collapse in prices in 
1866, though more modest than that observed in 1860-61.  Two similar boom-bust cycles 
were repeated over the next decade, with relative stability at low prices becoming the 
norm after development of very large new fields in other parts of Pennsylvania.  By 1890, 
oil production from Pennsylvania and New York was 5 times what it had been in 1870.  
Production in other states had grown to account for 38% of the U.S. total, and Russia was 
producing almost as much oil as the United States.  These factors and the recession of 
1890-91 had brought oil back down to 56¢/barrel by 1892.  
  However, that proved to be the end of the easy production from the original 
Pennsylvanian oilfields.  Annual production from Pennsylvania fell by 14 million barrels 
between 1891 and 1894  (see Figure 1), and indeed even with the more technologically 
advanced secondary recovery techniques adopted in much later decades, never again 
reached the levels seen in 1891 (Caplinger, 1997).  Williamson and Daum (1959, p. 577) 
suggested that the decline in production from the Appalachian field (Pennsylvania, West 
Virginia, and parts of Ohio and New York) along with a loss of world access to Russian 
production due to a cholera epidemic in Baku in 1894 were responsible for the spike in 
oil prices in 1895. 
  Dvir and Rogoff (2010) emphasized the parallels between the behavior of oil 
prices in the nineteenth century and that subsequently observed in the last quarter of the 
twentieth century.  There are some similarities, in terms of the interaction between the 5 
exhaustion in production of key fields with strong demand, and in either century there 
were buyers who were willing to pay a very high price.  But despite similarities, there are 
also some profound differences.  First, oil was of much less economic importance in the 
nineteenth century.  In 1900, the U.S. produced 63.6 million barrels of oil.  At an average 
price of  $1.19/barrel, that represents $75.7 million, which is only 0.4% of 1900 
estimated GNP of $18,700 million.  For comparison, in 2008, the U.S. consumed 7.1 
billion barrels of oil at an average price of $97.26/barrel, for an economic value of $692 
billion, or 4.8% of GDP. 
2. 1900-1945: Power and transportation. 
  There is another key respect in which petroleum came to represent a 
fundamentally different economic product as the twentieth century unfolded.  In the 
nineteenth century, the value of oil primarily derived from its usefulness for fabricating 
illuminants.  As the twentieth century developed, electric lighting came to replace these, 
while petroleum gained increasing importance for commercial and industrial heat and 
power as well as transportation, first for railroads and later for motor vehicles.  Figure 3 
shows that U.S. motor vehicle registrations rose from 0.1 vehicle per 1,000 residents in 
1900 to 87 by 1920 and 816 in 2008. 
  In addition to growing importance in terms of direct economic value, oil came to 
become an integral part of many other key economic sectors such as automobile 
manufacturing and sales, which as we shall see would turn out to be an important factor 
in business cycles after World War II. 
  The West Coast Gasoline Famine of 1920. Problems in the gasoline market on the 
U.S. west coast in 1920 might be viewed as the first oil-related shock of the 
transportation era.  U.S. consumption of crude oil had increased 53% between 1915 and 6 
1919 and increased an additional 27% in 1920 alone (Pogue, 1921, p. 61). Olmstead and 
Rhode (1985, pp. 1044-1045) provided this description: 
In the spring and summer of 1920 a serious gasoline famine crippled the entire 
West Coast, shutting down businesses and threatening vital services.  Motorists 
endured hour-long lines to receive 2-gallon rations, and, in many localities, fuel 
was unavailable for as long as a week at a time....  
 
[A]uthorities in Wenatchee, Washington, grounded almost 100 automobiles after 
spotting them late one Saturday night "on pleasure bent." Police ordered 
distributors not to serve these "joyriders" for the duration of the shortage. 
Seattle police began arresting drivers who left their parked vehicles idling. 
Everywhere individuals caught hoarding or using their privileged status to earn 
black market profits were cut off and even prosecuted. Many localities 
issued ration cards, and most major cities seriously considered it....  
 
On July 2 in Oakland, California, 150 cars queued at one station impeding 
traffic over a four-block area. On July 16, Standard's stations in Long Beach 
relaxed restrictions so that after 2:00 P.M., all cars (as opposed to only 
commercial vehicles) could buy up to 2 gallons. This caused such a jam 
that "it was necessary for the assistant special agent to spend two hours in keeping 
the traffic from blocking the streets".... Drivers in the Pacific Northwest endured 
2-gallon rations for several months, and even with these limits stations often 
closed by 9:00 A.M. In San Francisco, gunplay erupted in a dispute over ration 
entitlements. 
 
Petroleum was still much less important for the economy in 1920 than it was to 
become after World War II.  Moreover, these problems seem to have been confined to the 
West Coast, a much less populated region than it was later to become.  It is nevertheless 
perhaps worth noting that these shortages coincided with a U.S. business cycle 
contraction that the NBER dates as beginning January 1920 and ending July 1921, a 
correlation which as we will see would be repeated quite frequently later in the century.
3  
The Great Depression and state regulation.  Huge gains in production from 
Texas, California, and Oklahoma quickly eliminated the regional shortages of 1920 and 
                                                 
3 Interestingly, McMillin and Parker (1994) also found evidence that over the period 1924:M2-1938:M6, 
oil price changes could help predict subsequent changes in industrial production, with the effects both 
economically and statistically significant. 7 
induced a downward trend in oil prices over the next decade, with oil prices falling 40% 
between 1920 and 1926.  The decline in demand associated with advent of the Great 
Depression in 1929 magnified the price impact of phenomenal new discoveries such as 
the gigantic East Texas field which began production in 1930.  By 1931, the price of oil 
had dropped an additional 66% from its value in 1926. 
These competitive pressures facing the industry interacted with another challenge 
that had been present from the beginning-- how to efficiently manage a given reservoir.  
The industry had initially been guided by the rule of capture, which resulted in a chaotic 
race among producers to extract the oil from wells on adjacent properties.  For example, 
the gusher in Spindletop, Texas in 1901 was soon being exploited by over a hundred 
different companies (Yergin, 1991, p. 70) with more than 3 wells per acre (Williamson, 
et. al., 1963, p. 555).  This kind of development presented a classic tragedy of the 
commons problem in which significantly less oil was eventually extracted than would 
have been possible with better management of the reservoir.  The legitimate need for 
better-defined property rights interacted with the three other tides of the Great 
Depression-- growing supplies, falling demand, and a shifting political consensus 
favoring more regulation of industry and restrictions on competition.   
The result was that the United States emerged from the Great Depression with 
some profound changes in the degree of government supervision of the industry.  At the 
state level the key players were regulatory agencies such as the Texas Railroad 
Commission (TRC) and the Oklahoma Corporation Commission.  The states’ power was 
supplemented at the federal level by provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act 
of 1933 and the Connally Hot Oil Act of 1935, which prohibited interstate shipments of 8 
oil produced in violation of the state regulatory limits. 
Of the state agencies, the most important was Texas, which accounted for 40% of 
the crude petroleum produced in the United States between 1935 and 1960.  The TRC’s 
mandate was to “prevent waste”, which from the beginning was a mixture of the 
legitimate engineering issue of efficient field management and the more controversial 
economic goal of restricting production in order to ensure that producers received a 
higher price.  As the system evolved, the TRC would assign a “maximum efficient rate” 
at which oil could be extracted from a given well, and then specify an allowable monthly 
production flow for that well at some level at or below the maximum efficient rate.   
In terms of the narrow objective of preserving the long-run producing potential of 
oil fields, these regulatory efforts would be judged to be a success.  For example, 
Williamson, et. al. (1963, p. 554) noted that in fields in Texas and Oklahoma that were 
exploited before regulation, within 4-6 years the fields were producing less than 1/10 of 
what they had at their peak.  By contrast, fields developed after regulations were in place 
were still producing at 50-60% of their peak levels 15 years later.  Once production from 
the entire state of Texas peaked in 1972, the decline rate was fairly gradual (see Figure 
4), in contrast to the abrupt drops that were associated with the frenetic development of 
the Pennsylvanian fields seen in Figure 1. 
 3. 1946-1972: The early postwar era. 
  The United States has always been the world’s biggest consumer of oil, and 
remained the world’s biggest producer of petroleum until 1974 when it was surpassed by 
the Soviet Union.  In the initial postwar era, prices throughout the world were quoted 
relative to that for oil in the Gulf of Mexico (Adelman, 1972, Chapter 5), making the 
Texas Railroad Commission a key player in the world oil market. 9 
Although state regulation surely increased the quantity of oil that would 
ultimately be recovered from U.S. fields, it also had important consequences for the 
behavior of prices.  The production allowables set by the Texas Railroad Commission 
came to be based on an assessment of current market demand rather than pure 
considerations of conservation.  Each month, the TRC would forecast product demand at 
the current price and set allowable production levels consistent with this demand.  The 
result was that discounts or premiums were rarely allowed to continue long enough to 
lead to a change in posted prices, and the nominal price of oil was usually constant from 
one month to the next.  On the other hand,  the commissions would often take advantage 
of external supply disruptions to produce occasional abrupt changes in oil prices in the 
early postwar era (see Figure 5).  The nominal price of oil in the era of the Texas 
Railroad Commission thus turned out to be a fairly unique time series, changing only in 
response to specific identifiable events.
4 
1947-1948: Postwar dislocations.  The end of World War II marked a sharp 
acceleration in the transition to the automotive era.  U.S. demand for petroleum products 
increased 12% between 1945 and 1947 (Williamson, et. al., 1963, p. 805) and U.S. motor 
vehicle registrations increased by 22% (see Figure 3).  The price of crude oil increased  
80% over these two years,  but this proved insufficient to prevent spot accounts of 
shortages.  Standard Oil of Indiana and Phillips Petroleum Company announced plans in 
June of 1947 to ration gasoline allocations to dealers,
5 and in the fall there were reports of 
shortages in Michigan, Ohio, New Jersey, and Alabama.
6  Fuel oil shortages resulted in 
                                                 
4 This and the following discussion draws heavily from Hamilton (1983b, 1985). 
5 New York Times, June 25, 1947, 1:6; June 27, 33:2. 
6 New York Times, August 12, 1947, 46:1; August 22, 9:2; November 3, 25:7; November 19, 24:3. 10 
thousands without heat that winter.
7  An overall decline in residential construction 
spending began in 1948:Q3, with the first postwar U.S. recession dated as beginning in 
November of 1948. 
1952-1953: Supply disruptions and the Korean conflict.  The price of oil was 
frozen during the Korean War as a result of an order from the Office of Price 
Stabilization in effect from January 25, 1950 to February 13, 1953.
8  Prime Minister 
Mohammad Mossadegh nationalized Iran’s oil industry in the summer of 1951, and a 
world boycott of Iran in response removed 19 million barrels of monthly Iranian 
production from world markets.
9  A separate strike by U.S. oil refinery workers on April 
30, 1952 shut down a third of the nation’s refineries.
10  In response, the United States and 
British governments each ordered a 30% cut in delivery of fuel for civilian flights, while 
Canada suspended all private flying.
11  Kansas City and Toledo instituted voluntary plans 
to ration gasoline for automobiles, while Chicago halted operations of 300 municipal 
buses.
12  When the price controls were lifted in June of 1953, the posted price of West 
Texas Intermediate increased 10%.  The second postwar recession is dated as beginning 
the following month. 
1956-1957: Suez Crisis.  Egyptian President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal 
in July of 1956. Hoping to regain control of the canal, Britain and France encouraged 
Israel to invade Egypt’s Sinai territories on October 29, followed shortly after by their 
                                                 
7 New York Times, January 5, 1948, 11:2. 
8 From the New York Times, May 8, 1951, 45:1: The Office of Price Stabilization “announced a regulation 
establishing ceiling prices for new oil, generally at prices posted on January 25, for any given pool.  Prices 
for crude oil have been governed up to now by the general price ‘freeze’ which set the ceilings at the 
highest price attained between December 19, 1950 and January 25.” 
9 International Petroleum Trade, Bureau of Mines, U.S. Department of Interior, May 1952, p. 52. 
10 Wall Street Journal, May 7, 1952, p. 2. 
11 Wall Street Journal, May 5, 1952, 3:1; May 7, 2:2, May 12, 2:2. 
12 New York Times, May 5, 1952, 1:6; May 9, 16:7. 11 
own military forces.  During the conflict, 40 ships were sunk, blocking the canal through 
which 1-1/2 million barrels per day of oil were transported.  Pumping stations for the Iraq 
Petroleum Company’s pipeline, through which an additional half-million barrels per day 
moved through Syria to ports in the eastern Mediterranean, were also sabotaged.
13  Total 
oil production from the Middle East fell by 1.7 mb/d in November 1956.  As seen in 
Figure 6, that represents 10.1% of total world output at the time, which is a bigger 
fraction of world production than would be removed in any of the subsequent oil shocks 
that would be experienced over the following decades.     
These events had dramatic immediate economic consequences for Europe, which 
had been relying on the Middle East for 2/3 of its petroleum.  Consider for example in 
this account from the New York Times:
14 
LONDON, December 1-- Europe’s oil shortage resulting from the Suez Canal 
crisis was being felt more fully this week-end. . . . Dwindling gasoline supplies 
brought sharp cuts in motoring, reductions in work weeks and the threat of layoffs 
in automobile factories. 
 
There was no heat in some buildings; radiators were only tepid in others.  Hotels 
closed off blocks of rooms to save fuel oil. . . . [T]he Netherlands, Switzerland, 
and Belgium have banned [Sunday driving].  Britain, Denmark, and France have 
imposed rationing. 
 
Nearly all British automobile manufacturers have reduced production and put 
their employees on a 4-day instead of a 5-day workweek. . . . Volvo, a leading 
Swedish car manufacturer, has cut production 30%. 
 
In both London and Paris, long lines have formed outside stations selling 
gasoline. . . . Last Sunday, the Automobile Association reported that 70% of the 
service stations in Britain were closed. 
 
Dutch hotel-keepers estimated that the ban on Sunday driving had cost them up to 
85% of the business they normally would have expected. 
 
Within a few months, production from outside the Middle East was able to fill in 
                                                 
13 Oil and Gas Journal, Nov 12, 1956, 122-125. 12 
much of the gap.  For example, U.S. exports of crude oil and refined products increased a 
third of a million barrels a day in December.
15  By February, total world production of 
petroleum was back up to where it had been in October.  Middle East production had 
returned to its pre-crisis levels by June of 1957 (see Figure 6). 
Notwithstanding, overall real U.S. exports of goods and services started to fall 
after the first quarter of 1957 in what proved to be an 18% decline over the next year.  
This decline in exports was one of the factors contributing to the third postwar U.S. 
recession that began in August of that year. 
1969-1970: Modest price increases.  The oil price increases in 1969 and 1970 are 
in part a response to the broader inflationary pressures of the late 1960s (see Figure 7).  
However, the institutional peculiarities of the oil market caused these to be manifest in 
the form of the abrupt discrete adjustments observed in Figures 5 and 7 rather than a 
smooth continuous adaptation.  The immediate precipitating events for the end-of-decade 
price increases included a strike by east coast fuel oil deliverers in December of 1968, 
which was associated with local accounts of consumer shortages,
16 and followed by a 
nationwide strike on January 4 of the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers Union.  After 
settlement of the latter strike, Texaco led the majors in announcing a 7% increase in the 
price of all grades of crude oil on February 24, 1969, citing higher labor costs as the 
justification.
17   The rupture of the Trans-Arabian pipeline in May 1970 in Syria may 
have helped precipitate a second 8% jump in the nominal price of oil later that year.  The 
fifth postwar recession is dated as beginning in December of 1969, 10 months after the 
                                                                                                                                                 
14 New York Times, Dec 2, 1956, 1:5. 
15 Minerals Yearbook, 1957, p. 453. 
16 New York Times, Dec 25, 1968, 1:3; Dec 27, 1:5. 
17 New York Times, Feb 25, 1969, 53:3. 13 
first price increase. 
4. 1973-1996: The age of OPEC. 
It is helpful to put subsequent events into the perspective of some critical broader 
trends.  In the late 1960s, the Texas Railroad Commission was rapidly increasing the 
allowable production levels for oil wells in the state, and eliminated the “conservation” 
restrictions in 1972 (see Figure 8).  The subsequent drop in production from Texas fields 
observed in Figure 4 was due not to state regulation but rather to declining flow rates for 
mature fields.  Oil production for the United States as a whole also peaked in 1972, 
despite the production incentives subsequently to be provided by huge price increases 
after 1973 and the exploitation of the giant Alaskan oilfield in the 1980s (see Figure 9). 
Although there proved to be abundant supplies available in the Middle East to 
replace declining U.S. production, the transition from a world petroleum market centered 
in the Gulf of Mexico to one centered in the Persian Gulf did not occur smoothly.  In 
addition to the depletion of U.S. oil fields, Barsky and Kilian (2001) pointed to a number 
of other factors that would have warranted an increase in the relative price of oil in the 
early 1970s.  Among these was the U.S. unilateral termination of the rights of foreign 
central banks to convert dollars to gold.  The end of the Bretton Woods system caused a 
depreciation of the dollar and increase in the dollar price of most internationally traded 
commodities.  In addition, the nominal yield on 3-month Treasury bills was below the 
realized CPI inflation rate from August 1972 to August 1974.  These negative real 
interest rates may also have contributed to increases in relative commodity prices 
(Frankel, 2008).  Between August 1971 and August 1973, the producer price index for 
lumber increased 42%.  The PPI for iron and steel was up 8%, while nonferrous metals 
increased 19% and foodstuffs and feedstuffs 96%.  The 10% increase in the producer 14 
price index for crude petroleum between August 1971 and August 1973 was if anything 
more moderate than many other commodities.  Given declining production rates from 
U.S. fields, further increases in the price of oil would have been expected. 
Another factor making the transition to a higher oil import share more bumpy was 
the system of price controls implemented by President Nixon in conjunction with the 
abandonment of Bretton Woods in 1971.  By the spring of 1973, many gasoline stations 
had trouble obtaining wholesale gasoline, and consumers began to be affected, as 
described for example in this report from the New York Times:
18 
With more than 1,000 filling stations closed for lack of gasoline, according to a 
Government survey, and with thousands more rationing the amount a motorist 
may buy, the shortage is becoming a palpable fact of life for millions in this 
automobile-oriented country. 
 
The sixth postwar recession began in November 1973, just after the dramatic geopolitical 
events that most remember from this period.   
1973-1974: OPEC Embargo.  Syria and Egypt led an attack on Israel that began 
on October 6, 1973.  On October 17, the Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries announced an embargo on oil exports to selected countries viewed 
as supporting Israel, which was followed by significant cutbacks in OPEC’s total oil 
production.  Production from Arab members of OPEC in November was down 4.4 mb/d 
from what it had been in September, a shortfall corresponding to 7.5% of global output.
19  
Increases in production from other countries such as Iran offset only a small part of this 
(see Figure 10).  On January 1, 1974 the Persian Gulf countries doubled the price of oil. 
Accounts of gasoline shortages returned, such as this report from the New York 
                                                 
18 New York Times, Jun 8, 1973, 51:1. 15 
Times:
20 
HARTFORD, Dec 27-- “Some of the customers get all hot and heavy,” [Exxon 
service station attendant Grant] McMillan said.  “They scream up and down.... It’s 
ridiculous. 
 
The scene is a familiar one in Connecticut as service station managers find 
themselves having to decide whether to ration their gasoline or sell it as fast as 
they can and cut the number of arguments.... 
 
“People driving along, if they see anyone getting tanked up, they pull in and get in 
line,” said Bruce Faucher, an attendant at [a Citgo] station.  “If we don’t limit 
them, we’d be out in a couple of hours and wouldn’t have any for our regular 
customers.”  
 
Frech and Lee (1987) estimated that time spent waiting in queues to purchase gasoline 
added 12% to the cost of gasoline for urban residents in December 1973 and 50% in 
March 1974.  They assessed the problem to be more severe in rural areas, with estimated 
costs of 24% and 84%, respectively. 
Barsky and Kilian (2001) have emphasized the importance of the economic 
motivations noted earlier rather than the Arab-Israeli War itself as explanations for the 
embargo.  They noted that the Arab oil producers had discussed the possibility of an 
embargo prior to the war, and that the embargo was lifted without the achievement of its 
purported political objectives.  While there is no doubt that economic considerations were 
very important, Hamilton (2003, p. 389) argued that geopolitical factors played a role as 
well: 
If economic factors were the cause, it is difficult to see why such factors would 
have caused Arab oil producers to reach a different decision from nonArab oil 
producers.  Second, the embargo appeared to be spearheaded not by the biggest 
oil producers, who would be expected to have the most important economic stake, 
                                                                                                                                                 
19 Kilian (2008) suggested that this calculation overstates the effects of the embargo.  He argued that 
production by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait was unusually high in September 1973 and that there would have 
been some decreases from those levels even in the absence of an embargo. 
20 New York Times, Dec 18, 1973, 12. 16 
but rather by the most militant Arab nations, some of whom had no oil to sell at 
all. 
 
My conclusion is that, while it is extremely important to view the oil price increases of 
1973-1974 in a broader economic context, the specific timing, magnitude, and nature of 
the supply cutbacks were closely related to geopolitical events. 
1978-1979: Iranian revolution.  The 1973 Arab-Israeli War turned out to be only 
the beginning of a turbulent decade in the Middle East.  Figure 11 plots the monthly oil 
production for 5 of the key members of OPEC since 1973.  Iran (top panel) in defiance of 
the Arab states had increased its oil production during the 1973-74 embargo, but was 
experiencing large public protests in 1978.  Strikes spread to the oil sector by the fall of 
1978, bringing Iranian oil production down by 4.8 mb/d (or 7% of world production at 
the time) between October 1978 and January 1979.  In January the Shah fled the country, 
and Sheikh Khomeini seized power in February.   About a third of the lost Iranian 
production was made up by increases from Saudi Arabia and elsewhere (see Figure 12). 
Gasoline queues were again a characteristic of this episode, as seen in this report 
from the New York Times:
21 
LOS ANGELES, May 4-- “It’s horrible; it’s just like it was five years ago,” 
Beverly Lyons, whose Buick was mired 32d in a queue of more than 60 cars 
outside a Mobil station, said shortly after 8 o’clock this morning. 
 
I’ve been here an hour; my daughter expects her baby this weekend,” she added.  
“I’ve got to get some gas!” 
 
Throughout much of California today,  and especially so in the Los Angeles area, 
there were scenes reminiscent of the nation’s 1974 gasoline crisis. 
 
Lines of autos, vans, pickup trucks and motor homes, some of the lines were a 
half mile or longer, backed up from service stations in a rush for gasoline that 
appeared to be the result of a moderately tight supply of fuel locally that has been 
                                                 
21 New York Times, May 5, 1979, 11. 17 
aggravated by panic buying. 
 
Frech and Lee (1987) estimated that time spent waiting in line added about a third to the 
money cost for Americans to buy gasoline in May of 1979.  The seventh postwar 
recession is dated as beginning in January of 1980. 
1980-1981: Iran-Iraq War. Iranian production had returned to about half of its 
pre-revolutionary levels later in 1979, but was knocked out again when Iraq (second 
panel of Figure 11) launched a war against the country in September of 1980.  The 
combined loss of production from the two countries again amounted to about 6% of 
world production at the time, though within a few months, this shortfall had been made 
up elsewhere (see Figure 13). 
Whether one perceives the Iranian Revolution and Iran-Iraq War as two separate 
shocks or a single prolonged episode can depend on the oil price measure.  Some series, 
such as the WTI plotted in Figure 14, suggest one ongoing event, with the real price of oil 
doubling between 1978 and 1981.  Other measures, such as the U.S. producer price index 
for crude petroleum or consumer price index for gasoline, exhibit two distinct spurts.  
Interpreting any price series is again confounded by the role of price controls on crude 
petroleum, which remained in effect in the United States until January 1981.   
The National Bureau of Economic Research characterizes the economic 
difficulties at this time as being two separate economic recessions, with the seventh 
postwar recession ending in July 1980 but followed very quickly by the eighth postwar 
recession beginning July of 1981. 
  1981-1986: The great price collapse. The war between Iran and Iraq would 
continue for years, with oil production from the two countries very slow to recover.  18 
However, the longer term demand response of consuming countries to the price hikes of 
the 1970s proved to be quite substantial, and world petroleum consumption declined 
significantly in the early 1980s.  Saudi Arabia voluntarily shut down 3/4 of its production 
between 1981 and 1985, though this was not enough to prevent a 25% decline in the 
nominal price of oil and significantly bigger decline in the real price.  The Saudis 
abandoned those efforts, beginning to ramp production back up in 1986, causing the price 
of oil to collapse from $27/barrel in 1985 to $12/barrel at the low point in 1986.  
Although a favorable development from the perspective of oil consumers, this 
represented an “oil shock” for the producers.  Hamilton and Owyang (forthcoming) found 
that the U.S. oil-producing states experienced their own regional recession in the mid 
1980s. 
  1990-1991: First Persian Gulf War.  By 1990, Iraqi production had returned to its 
levels of the late 1970s, only to collapse again (and bring Kuwait’s substantial production 
down with it) when the country invaded Kuwait in August 1990.  The two countries 
accounted for nearly 9% of world production (see Figure 15), and there were concerns at 
the time that the conflict might spill over into Saudi Arabia.  Though there were no 
gasoline queues in America this time around, the price of crude oil doubled within the 
space of a few months.  The price spike proved to be of short duration, however, as the 
Saudis used the substantial excess capacity that they had been maintaining throughout the 
decade to restore world production by November to the levels seen prior to the conflict.  
The ninth postwar U.S. recession is dated as beginning in July of 1990. 
5. 1997-2010: A new industrial age. 
  The last generation has experienced a profound transformation for billions of the 
world’s citizens as countries made the transition from agricultural to modern industrial 19 
economies.  This has made a tremendous difference not only in their standards of living, 
but also for the world oil market.  A subset of the newly industrialized economies used 
only 17% of world’s petroleum in 1998 but accounts for 69% of the increase in global oil 
consumption since then.
22  Particularly noteworthy are the 1.3 billion residents of China.  
China’s 6.3% compound annual growth rate for petroleum consumption since 1998, if it 
continues for the next decade, would put the country at current American levels of oil 
consumption by 2022 and double current U.S. levels by 2033.  And such extrapolations 
do not seem out of the question.  Already China is the world’s biggest market for buying 
new cars.  Even so, China only has one passenger vehicle per 30 residents, compared 
with one vehicle per 1.3 residents in the United States (Hamilton, 2009a, p. 193).  
Whereas short-run movements in oil prices in the first half-century following World War 
II were dominated by developments in the Middle East, the challenges of meeting 
petroleum demand from the newly industrialized countries has been the most important 
theme of the last 15 years. 
  1997-1998: East Asian Crisis. The phenomenal growth in many of these countries 
had begun long before 1997, as economists marveled at the miracle of the “Asian tigers”.  
And although their contribution to world petroleum consumption at the time was modest, 
the Hotelling Principle suggests that a belief that their growth rate would continue could 
have been a factor boosting oil prices in the mid 1990s.
23  But in the summer of 1997, 
                                                 
22 These calculations to are based on Brazil, China, Hong Kong, India, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, 
and Thailand.  Data source: EIA, total petroleum consumption 
(http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=5&aid=2&cid=regions&syid=1980
&eyid=2009&unit=TBPD). 
23 World oil consumption grew by more than 2% per year between 1994 and 1997.  Moreover, if oil 
producers correctly anticipated the growth in petroleum demand from the newly industrialized countries, it 
would have paid them to hold off some production in 1995 in anticipation of higher prices to come.  By this 
mechanism, the perceived future growth rate can affect the current price.  See Hamilton (2009a, Section 
3.3) for a discussion of the Hotelling Principle. 20 
Thailand, South Korea, and other countries were subject to a flight from their currency 
and serious stresses on the financial system.  Investors developed doubts about the Asian 
growth story, putting economic and financial strains on a number of other Asian 
countries.  The dollar price of oil soon followed them down, falling below $12 a barrel by 
the end of 1998.  In real terms, that was the lowest price since 1972, and a price that 
perhaps never will be seen again. 
  1999-2000: Resumed growth. The Asian crisis proved to be short-lived, as the 
region returned to growth and the new industrialization proved itself to be very real 
indeed.  World petroleum consumption returned to strong growth in 1999, and by the end 
of the year, the oil price was back up to where it had been at the start of 1997.  The price 
of West Texas Intermediate continued to climb an additional 38% between November 
1999 and November 2000, after which it fell again in the face of a broader global 
economic downturn.  The tenth postwar U.S. recession began in March of 2001. 
  2003: Venezuelan unrest and the second Persian Gulf War.  A general strike 
eliminated 2.1 mb/d of oil production from Venezuela in December of 2002 and January 
of 2003.  This was followed shortly after by the U.S. attack on Iraq, which removed an 
additional 2.2 mb/d over April to July.  These would both be characterized as exogenous 
geopolitical events, and they show up dramatically in Figure 11.  Kilian (2008) argued 
they should be included in the list of postwar oil shocks.  However, the affected supply 
was a much smaller share of the global market than many of the other events discussed 
here, and the disruptions had little apparent effect on global oil supplies (see Figure 16).  
Indeed, when one takes a 12-month moving average of global petroleum production, one 
sees nothing but phenomenal growth throughout 2003 (Figure 17).   While oil prices rose 21 
between November 2002 and February 2003, the spike proved to be modest and short 
lived (see Figure 14).  
  2007-2008: Growing demand and stagnant supply.  Global economic growth in 
2004 and 2005 was quite impressive, with the IMF estimating that real gross world 
product grew at an average annual rate of 4.7%.
24  World oil consumption grew 5 mb/d 
over this period, or 3% per year.  These strong demand pressures were the key reason for 
the steady increase in the price of oil over this period, though there was initially enough 
excess capacity to keep production growing along with demand. 
  However, as seen in Figure 17, production did not continue to grow after 2005.  
Unlike many other historical oil shocks, there was no dramatic geopolitical event 
associated with this.  Ongoing instability in places like Iraq and Nigeria were a 
contributing factor.  Another is that several of the oil fields that had helped sustain earlier 
production gains reached maturity with relatively rapid decline rates.  Production from 
the North Sea accounted for 8% of world production in 2001, but had fallen more than 2 
mb/d from these levels by the end of 2007.
25  Mexico’s Cantarell, which recently had 
been the world’s second largest producing field, saw its production decline 1 mb/d 
between 2005 and 2008.  Indonesia, one of the original members of the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries, saw its production peak in 1998 and is today an importer 
rather than an exporter of oil. 
  But the most important country in recent years has surely been Saudi Arabia.  The 
kingdom accounted for 13% of global field production in 2005, and had played an active 
role as the world’s residual supplier during the 1980s and 1990s, increasing production 
                                                 
24 Details for the these calculations are provided in Hamilton (2009b, p. 229). 22 
whenever needed.  Many analysts had assumed that the Saudis would continue to play 
this role, increasing production to accommodate growing demand in the 2000s.
26  In the 
event, however, Saudi production was 850,000 barrels a day lower in 2007 than it had 
been in 2005. 
  Explanations for the Saudi decline vary.  Their magnificent Ghawar field has been 
in production since 1951 and in recent years has perhaps accounted for 6% of world 
production all by itself.  Simmons (2005) was persuaded that Ghawar may have peaked.   
Gately (2001), on the other hand, argued that it would not be in the economic interest of 
OPEC to provide the increased production that many analysts had assumed.  Although 
they reached their conclusions for different reasons, both Simmons and Gately were 
correct in their prediction that Saudi production would fail to increase as other analysts 
had assumed it would. 
  Notwithstanding, demand continued to grow, with world real GDP increasing an 
additional 5% per year in 2006 and 2007, a faster rate of economic growth than had 
accompanied the 5 mb/d increased oil consumption between 2003 and 2005.  China alone 
did increase its consumption by 840,000 barrels a day between 2005 and 2007.  With no 
more oil being produced, that meant other countries had to decrease their consumption 
despite strongly growing incomes.  The short-run price elasticity of oil demand has never 
been very high (Hamilton, 2009a), and may have been even smaller over the last decade 
(Hughes, Knittel, and Sperling, 2008), meaning that a very large price increase was 
necessary to contain demand. Hamilton (2009b, p. 231) provided illustrative assumptions 
under which a large shift of the demand curve in the face of a limited increase in supply 
                                                                                                                                                 
25 Energy Information Administration, Monthly Energy Review, Table 11.1b 
(http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/merquery/mer_data.asp?table=T11.01b). 23 
would have warranted an increase in the price of oil from $55 a barrel in 2005 to $142 a 
barrel in 2008. 
  Others have suggested that the return to negative ex post real interest rates in 
August 2007 and the large flows of investment dollars into commodity futures markets 
magnified these fundamentals and introduced a speculative bubble in the price of oil and 
other commodities; for discussion see Hamilton (2009b), Tang and Xiong (2010), Kilian 
and Murphy (2010), and Büyükşahin and Robe (2010).  Whatever the cause, the oil price 
spike of 2007-2008 was by some measures the biggest in postwar experience, and the 
U.S. recession that began in December of 2007 was likewise the worst in postwar 
experience, though of course the financial crisis rather than any oil-related disruptions 
were the leading contributing factor in that downturn.
27 
6. Discussion. 
Table 1 summarizes key features of the postwar events discussed in the preceding 
sections.  The first column indicates months in which there were contemporary accounts 
of consumer rationing of gasoline.  Ramey and Vine (forthcoming) have emphasized that 
non-price rationing can significantly amplify the economic dislocations associated with 
oil shocks.  There were at least some such accounts for 5 of the 7 episodes prior to 1980, 
but none since then. 
The third column indicates whether price controls on crude oil or gasoline were in 
place at the time.  This is relevant for a number of reasons.  First, price controls are of 
course a major explanation for why non-price rationing such as reported in column 1 
would be observed.  And although there were no explicit price controls in effect in 1947, 
                                                                                                                                                 
26 See for example International Energy Agency, World Economic Outlook, 2007. 24 
the threat that they might be imposed at any time was quite significant (Goodwin and 
Herren, 1975), and this is presumably one reason why reports of rationing are also 
associated with this episode.  No price controls were in effect in the United States in 
1956, but they do appear to have been in use in Europe, where the rationing at the time 
was reported. 
Second, price controls were sometimes an important factor contributing to the 
episode itself.  Controls can inhibit markets from responding efficiently to the challenges 
and can be one cause of inadequate or misallocated supply.  In addition, the lifting of 
price controls was often the explanation for the discrete jump eventually observed in 
prices, as was the case for example in June 1953 and February 1981.  The gradual lifting 
of price ceilings was likewise a reason that events such as the exile of the Shah of Iran in 
January of 1979 showed up in oil prices only gradually over time. 
Price controls also complicate what one means by the magnitude of the observed 
price change associated with a given episode.  Particularly during the 1970s, there was a 
very involved set of regulations with elaborate rules for different categories of crude oil.  
Commonly used measures of oil prices look quite different from each other over this 
period.  Hamilton (forthcoming) found that the producer price index for crude petroleum 
has a better correlation over this period with the prices consumers actually paid for 
gasoline than do other popular measures such as the price of West Texas Intermediate or 
the refiner acquisition cost.  I have for this reason used the crude petroleum PPI over the 
period 1973-1981 as the basis for calculating the magnitude of the price change reported 
in the second column of Table 1.  For all other dates the reported price change is based on 
                                                                                                                                                 
27 Hamilton (2009b) nevertheless noted some avenues by which the oil shock contributed directly to the 
financial crisis itself. 25 
the monthly WTI. 
The fourth column of Table 1 summarizes key contributing factors in each 
episode.  Many of these episodes were associated with dramatic geopolitical 
developments arising out of conflicts in the Middle East.  Strong demand confronting a 
limited supply response also contributed to many of these episodes.  The table collects 
the price increases of 1973-74 together, though in many respects the shortages in the 
spring of 1973 and the winter of 1973-74 were distinct events with distinct causes.  The 
modest price spikes of 1969 and 1970 have likewise been grouped together for purposes 
of the summary. 
The discrete character of oil price changes seen in Figure 5 for the era of the 
Texas Railroad Commission  makes the choice of dates to include in the table rather 
straightforward prior to 1972.  After 1972, oil prices changed continuously, and there is 
more subjective judgment involved in determining which events are significant enough to 
be included.  For example, the price increase of 2000 could well be viewed as the 
continuation of a trend that started with the trough reached after the southeast Asian crisis 
of 1997.  However, the price increases in 1998 and 1999 only restored the price level 
back to where it had been in January 1997.  Based on the evidence reported in Hamilton 
(2003), the episode is dated in Table 1 as beginning with the new highs reached in 
December 1999.   
An alternative approach to the narrative summary provided by Table 1 is to try to 
use statistical methods to determine what constitutes an oil shock (e.g., Hamilton, 2003), 
or to disentangle broadly defined shocks to oil supply from changes in demand arising 
from growing global income, as in Kilian (2009) and Baumeister and Peersman (2009).  26 
Although it is very helpful to bring such methods to these questions, the identifying 
assumptions necessary to interpret such decompositions are controversial.  Kilian (2009) 
and Baumeister and Peersman (2009) attributed a bigger role to demand disturbances in 
episodes such as the oil price increase of the late 1970s than the narrative approach 
adopted here has suggested, and also explored the possible contribution of speculative 
demand and inventory building to the price increases. 
As noted in the previous sections, these historical episodes were often followed 
by economic recessions in the United States.  The last column of Table 1 reports the 
starting date of U.S. recessions as determined by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research.  All but one of the 11 postwar recessions were associated with an increase in 
the price of oil, the single exception being the recession of 1960.  Likewise, all but one of 
the 12 oil price episodes listed in Table 1 were accompanied by U.S. recessions, the 
single exception being the 2003 oil price increase associated with the Venezuelan unrest 
and second Persian Gulf War. 
The correlation between oil shocks and economic recessions appears to be too 
strong to be just a coincidence (Hamilton, 1983a, 1985).  And although demand pressure 
associated with the later stages of a business cycle expansion seems to have been a 
contributing factor in a number of these episodes, statistically one cannot predict the oil 
price changes prior to 1973 on the basis of prior developments in the U.S. economy 
(Hamilton, 1983a).  Moreover, supply disruptions arising from dramatic geopolitical 
events are prominent causes of a number of the most important episodes.  Insofar as 
events such as the Suez Crisis and first Persian Gulf War were not caused by U.S. 
business cycle dynamics, a correlation between these events and subsequent economic 27 
downturns should be viewed as causal.  This is not to claim that the oil price increases 
themselves were the sole cause of most postwar recessions.  Instead the indicated 
conclusion is that oil shocks were a contributing factor in at least some postwar 
recessions. 
That an oil price increase could exert some drag on the economy of an oil-
importing country should not be controversial.  On the supply side, energy is a factor of 
production, and an exogenous decrease in its supply would be expected to be associated 
with a decline in productivity.  However, standard neoclassical reasoning suggests that 
the size of such an effect should be small.  If the dollar value of the lost energy is less 
than the dollar value of the lost production, it would pay the firm to bid up the price of 
energy so as to maintain production.  But the dollar value of the lost energy is relatively 
modest compared with the dollar value of production lost in a recession.  For example, 
the global production shortfall associated with the OPEC embargo (the area above the 
dashed line in Figure 10) averaged 2.3 mb/d over the 6 months following September 
1973.  Even at a price of $12/barrel, this only represents a market value of $5.1 billion 
spread over the entire world economy.  By contrast, U.S. real GDP declined at a 2.5% 
annual rate between 1974:Q1 and 1975:Q1, which would represent about $38 billion 
annually in 1974 dollars for the U.S. alone.  The dollar value of output lost in the 
recession exceeded the dollar value of the lost energy by an order of magnitude. 
Alternatively, oil shocks could affect the economy through the demand side.  The 
short-run elasticity of oil demand is very low.
28  If consumers try to maintain their real 
purchases of energy in the face of rising prices, their saving or spending on other goods 28 
must fall commensurately.  Although there are offsetting income gains for domestic oil 
producers, the marginal propensity to spend out of oil company windfall profits may be 
low, and by 1974, more than a third of U.S. oil was imported.  Again, however, the direct 
effects one could assign to this mechanism are limited.  For example, between September 
1973 and July 1974, U.S. consumer purchases of energy goods and services increased by 
$14.4 billion at an annual rate,
29 yet the output decline was more than twice this amount. 
Hamilton (1988) stressed the importance of the composition of consumer 
spending in addition to its overall level.  For example, one of the key responses seen 
following an increase in oil prices is a decline in automobile spending, particularly the 
larger vehicles manufactured in the United States (Edelstein and Kilian, 2009; Ramey 
and Vine, forthcoming).  Insofar as specialized labor and capital devoted to the 
manufacture and sales of those vehicles are difficult to shift into other uses, the result can 
be a drop in income that is greater than the lost purchasing power by the original 
consumers.  Table 2 reproduces the calculations in Hamilton (2009b) on the behavior of 
real GDP in the 5 quarters following each of 5 historical oil shocks, and the specific 
contribution made to this total from motor vehicles and parts alone.  This did seem to 
make a material contribution in many cases.  For example, in the 5 quarters following the 
oil price increases of 1979:Q2 and 1990:Q3, real GDP would have increased rather than 
fallen had there been no decline in autos.  In addition, there appears to be an important 
response of consumer sentiment to rapid increases in energy prices (Edelstein and Kilian, 
2009).  Combining these changes in spending with traditional Keynesian multiplier 
                                                                                                                                                 
28 See for example the literature surveys by Dahl and Sterner (1991), Dahl (1993), Espey (1998), Graham 
and Glaister (2004) and Brons, et. al. (2008).  Examples of studies finding higher elasticities include Kilian 
(2010), Baumeister and Peersman (2009), and Davis and Kilian (forthcoming). 
29 Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 2.3.5.U. 29 
effects appears to be the most plausible explanation for why oil shocks have often been 
followed by economic downturns. 
In addition to disruptions in supply arising from geopolitical events, another 
contributing factor for several of the historical episodes is the interaction of growing 
petroleum demand with production declines from the mature producing fields on which 
the world had come to depend.  In the postwar experience, this appears to be part of the 
story behind the 1973-1974 and 2007-2008 oil price spikes, and, going back in time, in 
the 1862-1864 and 1895 price run-ups as well.  It is unclear as of this writing where the 
added global production will come from to replace traditional sources such as the North 
Sea, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia, if production from the latter has indeed peaked.   
But given the record of geopolitical instability in the Middle East, and the 
projected phenomenal surge in demand from the newly industrialized countries, it seems 
quite reasonable to expect that within the next decade we will have an additional row of 
data to add to Table 1 with which to inform our understanding of the economic 
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Price increase  Price controls  Key factors  Business cycle 
peak 







May 52  Jun 53 (10%)  yes  strike, 
controls lifted 
Jul 53 
Nov 56-Dec 56 
(Europe) 




Suez Crisis  Aug 57 
none none  no  ---  Apr  60 
none  Feb 69 (7%) 
Nov 70 (8%) 






Dec 73- Mar 74 
Apr 73-Sep 73 
(16%) 
Nov 73-Feb 74 
(51%) 




May 79-Jul 79  May 79-Jan 80 
(57%) 
yes  Iranian revolution  Jan 80 
none  Nov 80-Feb 81 
(45%) 
yes Iran-Iraq  War, 
controls lifted 
Jul 81 
none  Aug 90-Oct 90 
(93%) 
no  Gulf War I  Jul 90 
none  Dec 99-Nov 00 
(38%)  
no  strong demand  Mar 01 
none  Nov 02-Mar 03 
(28%)  
no Venezuela  unrest, 
Gulf War II 
none 
none  Feb 07-Jun 08 
(145%) 
no strong  demand, 
stagnant supply 
Dec 07 34 
Table 2.  Real GDP growth (annual rate) and contribution of autos to the overall GDP 
growth rate in five historical episodes. 
 
Period  GDP growth rate  Contribution of autos 
1974:Q1-1975:Q1 -2.5%  -0.5% 
1979:Q2-1980:Q2 -0.4%  -0.8% 
1981:Q2-1982:Q2 -1.5%  -0.2% 
1990:Q3-1991:Q3 -0.1%  -0.3% 
2007:Q4-2008:Q4 -0.7%  -0.7% 35 
 










Figure 1. Estimated production from Pennsylvania and New York, in millions of barrels 
per year, 1859-1897.  Data source: Derrick’s Hand-Book, pp. 804-805. 36 










Figure 2. One hundred times the natural logarithm of the real price of oil, 1861-2009, in 
2009 U.S. dollars.  Data source: Statistical Review of World Energy 2010, BP; Jenkins 
(1985, Table 18); and Historical Statistics of the United States, Table E 135-166, 
Consumer Prices Indexes (BLS), All Items, 1800 to 1970, as detailed in footnote 1. 37 












Figure 3. Total U.S. vehicle registrations per thousand U.S. residents, 1900-2008.  Data 
source: Historical Statistics of the United States, Millenium Edition Online, Table Aa6-8 
and Table Df339-342, U.S. Department of Census, 2010 Statistical Abstract, and U.S. 
Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Highway Statistics, 
annual reports. 38 







Figure 4. Annual production from the state of Texas, in millions of barrels per day, 1935-
2009.  Data source: Railroad Commission of Texas 
(http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/data/production/oilwellcounts.php). 39 









Figure 5. Dollar price per barrel of West Texas Intermediate, 1947:M1-1973:M12.  
















Figure 6. Oil production after the Suez Crisis. Dashed line: change in monthly global 
crude oil production from October 1956 as a percentage of October 1956 levels.  Solid 
line: change in monthly Middle East oil production from October 1956 as a percentage of 
global levels in October 1956.  Horizontal axis: number of months from October 1956.  
Data source: Oil and Gas Journal, various issues from November 5, 1956 to July 3, 1957. 41 










Figure 7.  Price of oil in 2009 dollars, 1967:M2-1974:M12.  Price of West Texas 
Intermediate deflated by CPI. 42 









Figure 8. TRC allowable production as a percent of maximum efficient rate, 1954:Q1-
1972:Q4.  Data source: Railroad Commission of Texas, Annual Reports. 43 








Figure 9. U.S. field production of crude oil, 1920:M12-2010:M9.  Average over 
preceding 12 months in millions of barrels per day.  Data source: Energy Information 
Administration (http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_crd_crpdn_adc_mbblpd_m.htm). 44 











Figure 10. Oil production after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Dashed line: change in 
monthly global crude oil production from September 1973 as a percentage of September 
1973 levels.  Solid line: change in monthly oil production of Arab members of OPEC 
from September 1973 as a percentage of global levels in September 1973.  Horizontal 
axis: number of months from September 1973.  Data source: Energy Information 
Administration, Monthly Energy Review, Tables 11.1a and 11.1b 
(http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/merquery/mer_data.asp?table=T11.01a).   45 
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Figure 11. Monthly production rates (in mb/d) for 5 OPEC members, 1973:M1-2010:M8.  
Data source: Energy Information Administration, Monthly Energy Review, Table 11.1a 
(http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/merquery/mer_data.asp?table=T11.01a).46 











Figure 12. Oil production after the 1978 Iranian revolution. Dashed line: change in 
monthly global crude oil production from October 1978 as a percentage of October 1978 
levels.  Solid line: change in monthly Iranian oil production from October 1978 as a 
percentage of global levels in October 1978.  Horizontal axis: number of months from 
October 1978.  Data source: Energy Information Administration, Monthly Energy 
Review, Tables 11.1a and 11.1b 
(http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/merquery/mer_data.asp?table=T11.01a).  47 











Figure 13. Oil production after the Iran-Iraq War. Dashed line: change in monthly global 
crude oil production from September 1980 as a percentage of September 1980 levels.  
Solid line: change in monthly oil production of Iran and Iraq from September 1980 as a 
percentage of global levels in September 1980.  Horizontal axis: number of months from 
September 1980.  Data source: Energy Information Administration, Monthly Energy 
Review, Tables 11.1a and 11.1b 
(http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/merquery/mer_data.asp?table=T11.01a). 48 










Figure 14.  Price of oil in 2009 dollars, 1973:M1-2010:M10.  Price of West Texas 
Intermediate deflated by CPI. 49 












Figure 15. Oil production after the first Persian Gulf War. Dashed line: change in 
monthly global crude oil production from August 1990 as a percentage of August 1990 
levels.  Solid line: change in monthly oil production of Iraq and Kuwait from August 
1990 as a percentage of global levels in August 1990.  Horizontal axis: number of months 
from August 1990.  Data source: Energy Information Administration, Monthly Energy 
Review, Tables 11.1a and 11.1b 
(http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/merquery/mer_data.asp?table=T11.01a). 50 












Figure 16. Oil production after the Venezuelan unrest and the second Persian Gulf War. 
Dashed line: change in monthly global crude oil production from November 2002 as a 
percentage of November 2002 levels.  Solid line: change in monthly oil production of 
Venezuela and Iraq from November 2002 as a percentage of global levels in November 
2002.  Horizontal axis: number of months from November 2002.  Data source: Energy 
Information Administration, Monthly Energy Review, Tables 11.1a and 11.1b 
(http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/merquery/mer_data.asp?table=T11.01a). 51 












Figure 17.  World oil production, 2003:M1-2010:M9.  Includes lease condensate, natural 
gas plant liquids, other liquids, and refinery process gain.  Data source: Energy 
Information Administration, International Petroleum Monthly 
(http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/ipsr/t44.xls). 
 
 
 